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Interest  ates and Exchange Rates: II 
olicy Implications 
Over the last two years, u.S. officials have 
become increasingly concerned with the 
effects of  their actions upon the foreign-
exchange markets. In November 1978 and 
again in October 1979, the Federal Reserve 
took actions to slow money growth, partly in 
order to stabilize the international value of 
the dollar. The procedures that the Fed 
adopted last October were designed in par-
ticular to promote steadier.growth of the 
money stock. Butthese procedures allow 
interest rates to vary more freely than in the 
past, and this has generated some concern 
that increased interest-rate variations may 
lead to greater fluctuations in the value of the 
dollar. 
In fact, the new control procedures may 
substantially alter the previous associations 
between interest-rate and exchange-rate 
changes. But we cannot say whether the 
overall variability of exchange rates will rise, 
because in one important sense the stability 
of  the dollar may actually increase. In last 
week's article, we explained that spot 
exchange rates tend to rise when interest rates 
increase in real terms, while exchange rates 
tend to fall when interest rates increase due to 
higher expected inflation. We argue here that 
the new money-control procedures may 
increase variations in real interest rates, but 
that they also promise to reduce inflation 
expectations and so reduce interest-rate fluc-
tuations from this source. As a result, U.S. 
interest rates and exchange rates may rise and 
fall together in the short-run-more often 
than they did before last October-but  the 
long-term stability of the dollar may actually 
be enhanced. 
Old way 
The widespread impression that the Federal 
Reserve previously sought to control interest 
rates is on ly partly correct. Before as well as 
after October 1979, its goal was control ofthe 
nation's rnoney supply. But the Fed 
previously used short-term interest rates as a 
guide, or intermediate target, in this 
endeavor. The rationale was that the amount 
of money the public wants to hold is deter-
mined primarily by its level of income (a 
proxy for the transaction demand for money) 
and by short-term interest rates (a proxy for 
the  "opportunity  cost"  of  holding  non-
interest-earning money balances). Higher 
interest rates thus would lower the amount of 
money demanded. 
Underthe old procedures, the Federal 
Reserve sought to vary interest rates so that 
the public would want to hold just the 
amount of money the Fed wanted to supply. 
For example, when it wanted to lower the 
level of money, the Fed would raise interest 
rates (by supplying less reserves to the bank-
ing system). As a result, the public's demand 
for money would fall, and with it the actual 
level of  money. Thus, in theory, the Fed could 
keep money growth on target by raising or 
lowering interest rates. 
In practice, the Fed found it very difficult to 
control money growth adequately using 
interest-rate targets. The reason is that "hit-
ting" its money targets often required sub-
stantial changes in interest rates over fairly 
short intervals. But in view of  the incomplete 
and imprecise nature of  economic informa-
tion, Fed officials were often reluctant to 
impose the "certain" cost of higher interest 
rates on the economy for the "uncertain" 
benefits of slowing money growth. 
The Fed, under the old procedures, conse-
quently limited variations in interest rates 
substantially in the short-run-and in the 
process, smoothed changes in real interest 
rates due to fluctuations in liquidity.ltdidthis 
by supplying reserves to the banking system 
to accommodate fluctuations in their demand. But as a result, interest rates did not 
vary enough to keep money on target. In fact, 
money growth accelerated sharply during 
business-cycle expansions, as the Fed held 
interest rates down by accommodating re-
serve increases. On the other hand, money 
growth often fell below target during con-
tractions, as the Fed kept interest rates from 
falling by withdrawing reserves from the 
banking system. 
Consequently, increasingly violent and 
prolonged fluctuations in money growth 
occurred about a rising trend. This led to 
ever-higher and more variable inflation, and 
thus to increasing variations in the inflation-
premium component of interest rates. Thus, 
much of the rise in interest rates in recent 
years has been associated with a rise 'in infia-
tion (see chart). As explained in last week's 
article, this common factor-inflation-led 
to the 1977-78 pattern of rising U.S. interest 
rates and a falling dollar. On the other hand, 
the real interest rate-the difference between 
the market rate and the inflation premium-
has generally varied much less than the infla-
tion premium. This can be seen from the 
chart, where the real rate can be approxi-
mated as the difference between the market 
rate and the past inflation rate (a proxy for 
expected inflation). According to this 
measure, real interest-rate variations were 
fairly moderate until October 1979. 
New way 
The increasing difficulty of controlling 
inflation by targeting interest rates led the Fed 
last October to adopt a more direct method 
for controlling the amount of money avail-
able to the publ ic. Most of  th is money is held 
as commercial-bank checking deposits, and 
these deposits are backed by the banking 
system's cash reserves that are supplied by 
the Federal Reserve.  Under the new pro-
cedure, the Fed controls these cash reserves 
directly-allowing market interest rates to 
fluctuate more freely in the short-term -so  as 
to promote a steady growth in the level of 
money. Once the inevitable technical 
difficulties ,attending such a substantial 
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procedural change are remedied, the new 
technique promises to promote greater 
stability in money growth-and hence lower 
and more stable inflation. But because this 
approach will not automatically accommo-
date short-term changes in real interest rates, 
we might expect interest rates (and exchange 
rates) to vary more than before. But will this 
really be the case? Perhaps in the short-run 
but not in the long-run. 
In fact, while the old procedures probably 
reduced short-term variations in real interest 
rates, they also permitted overshooting of  the 
money-supply targets and thus increased 
inflation expectations, and hence the infla-
tion premium. Conversely, the new pro-
cedure may lead to more short-term variation 
in real interest rates-but less long-term 
variation in market rates, provided it is 
successful in controlling money growth. 
This observation has two important conse-
quences for exchange rates. First, under the 
new procedures, changes in market interest 
rates may reflect variations in real rates, rather 
than inflation premia, more often than pre-
viously.lf  so, the value ofthe dollar is likely to 
rise more often than before whenever u.s. 
interest rates increase relative to abroad. Of 
course, in view of  the impact of foreign 
interest rates on exchange rates, the extent of 
the change in the relation between interest 
rates and exchange rates will also depend on 
foreigners' abi I  ity to control thei r own money 
growth and inflation. 
Perhaps most important, the new procedures 
are likely to promote the longer-term stability 
of the dollar, even if  they lead to somewhat 
greater short-run fluctuations. Over the last 
seven years, prolonged rises and declines in 
currency values have usually resulted from 
fluctuations in money growth and inflation 
rates here and abroad. Indeed, many of  the 
more violent and sudden changes in the 
dollar,  such  as  during  mid-1978  and  mid-
1979, have been prompted by shifts in market 
perceptions aboutthe inflation policies of  the 
u.s. and other industrial countries. Gen-erally, market decisions about foreign trade 
and investment are made on the basis of long-
term rather than short-term trends in ex-
change rates. Thus the beneficial effect of 
greater long-run dollar stability is likely to 
outweigh any rise in short-term variability for 
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trade and inve.stment. Hence, on balance, the 
new Fed procedures for controlling money 
and inflation are likely to prove beneficial to 
the world economy. 
Michael Keran & Charles Pigott 






*Estimated based on past inflation 
3 IaANIKING DATA-TWELfTH FEDERAL R.ESERVE OBSTRUCT 
(pollar amounts in millions) 
Selected Assets amiliabiiities 
Luge Commercial Ban!cs 
Loans (gross, adjusted) and investments* 
Loans (gross, adjusted) - total# 
Commercial and industrial 
Real estate 
Loans to individuals 
Securities loans 
U.s. Treasury securities* 
Other securities* 
Demand deposits - total# 
Demand deposits - adjusted 
Savings deposits - total 
Time deposits - total# 
Individuals, part. & corp. 






































W~My  Averages  Weekended  Weekended 
OIf Daily figures 
fviember- Bank Reserve Position 
Excess Reserves (+  )/Deficiency (  - ) 
Borrowings 
Net free reserves (+  )/Net borrowed( - ) 
* Excludes trading account securities. 
#  Includes items not shown separately. 
9/3/80  8/27/80 
8  86 
133  24 
- 141  - 110 
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Change from 
year ago 
Dollar  Percent 
6,808  5.1 
8,218  7.5 
2,168  6.8 
7,282  18.1 
382  1.6 
927  - 48.4 
1,189  - 15.5 
221  1.4 
936  2.0 
1,523  4.9 
1,075  - 3.5 
10,177  19.2 
10,324  23.2 
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